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1.  Introduction 
In this paper we try to bridge two very different literatures on India’s economic 
development. The first relates to explaining India’s rapid growth in savings. Contributing 
almost 38 percent of GDP in 2008, domestic savings has been fuelling India’s growth 
acceleration.  Moreover, household savings, averaging above 60 percent of domestic 
savings since the 1950s, remains the predominant source of Indian savings (RBI, 2009). 
Explaining the growth in savings is therefore a central task in understanding India’s 
economic resurgence. The second literature relates to Asia’s widely documented gender 
imbalances, an issue often referred to as “missing women”, “female infanticide” or 
“gendercide” (The Economist, 2010). While much of this literature seeks to explain the 
phenomenon or account for its social consequences, we hypothesize that an important 
economic consequence of the gender imbalance is increased competition in the marriage 
market, which may induce higher pre-marital savings.  
With regard to the first of these literatures, there are several competing 
explanations of household savings behavior. The precautionary saving motive is one of 
the oldest theories used to explain savings.  The basic idea is that households save to 
smooth future consumption when faced with income uncertainty (Friedman, 1957).  If an 
economy became more volatile due to economic liberalization, for example, the 
permanent income hypothesis would predict increased savings. But while this might 
account for some of the surge in Chinese savings, the hypothesis is not convincing in the 
Indian setting where privatization has been limited, and where social protection programs 3 
 
have been scaled up rather than scaled down (admittedly, many evaluations of these 
programs often suggest that they are rather ineffective – see Jha and Bhattacharyya, 
2010).   
A second explanation is the level of financial development and the general 
macroeconomic environment.  Improved accessibility to banks reduced transaction costs 
and thus encourages financial savings (Athukorala, 1998), although financial 
development could reduce savings as households have better access to credit and are able 
to finance their consumption with lower savings (Loayza and Shankar, 2000).  Like 
China, India’s financial sector has developed rapidly since the reforms of 1991. Bank 
deposits, for example, grew by almost 17% over 1991-2004, while district level data 
show that credit or deposits as a percentage of district output roughly doubled between 
1991 and 2001 (Kendall, 2009). Savings could also be driven by higher real interest rates 
(lower inflation). However, another view if financial development is that it is driven by 
growth rather than a driver of growth (Robinson, 1952). This also raises the possibility 
that higher savings in India is caused by growth rather a cause of growth. 
A third explanation is explicitly demographic in nature. The life-cycle hypothesis 
(Modigliani, 1970) relating savings to the age profile of the population.  Modigliani’s 
model predicts that savings rate rise with the proportion of the working age population 
who are at the peak of their earning potential, and decreases with the proportion of the 
young and elderly population, as dissaving behavior is displayed. In India, the ratio of 
dependent to working age adults declined from 77% in 1960 to 60% in 2006, and Loayza 4 
 
and Shankar (2000) do indeed find macroeconomic evidence that this sharp demographic 
transition explains the rising rate of savings in India.  
The theory proposed in this paper also links to the demographic literature. 
Specifically, we test a prediction resulting from the microeconomic model of the 
“marriage market” (Becker, 1973,1974; Grossbard-Shechtman, 1993, 2003). This theory 
explains men’s and women’s mate selectivity in part as a function of their own “supply” 
and “demand.” If there are too many men relative to the number of women, then the 
“supply” of men is high. When this is the case two things may happen. First, men’s 
“value” decreases and women’s increases, so men have to lower their standards and 
become less selective in order to find a mate. Alternatively, men (or their parents) can 
behave competitively and carry out investments designed to enhance their attractiveness 
in the marriage market. The operational sex ratio (the ratio of available men to available 
women) thus becomes a crucial factor in the rational choice theory of marriage market 
(Bokek-Cohen et al., 2007).  
In the developed world a relatively large economic literature has validated the 
importance of sex ratios in determining marriage market outcomes. For example, 
Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002) find that the higher the ratio of men to women in 
Israel, the more husbands share their incomes with their wives. Angrist (2002) studies the 
influx of various immigrant groups into the United States, and the effect of the sex ratios 
of different nationality groups on the largely endogamous marriage of the second 
generation. His analysis shows that higher sex ratios also decrease women’s labor force 5 
 
participation. South and Lloyd (1992) find that the quantity and quality of potential 
husbands increase both the rates of marriage and divorce because married women can 
find better alternatives if there are more unmarried men in the area. Similarly, South and 
Lloyd (1995) find that the number of unmarried women in school or labor force increases 
the rates of divorce because married men can find better alternatives in such conditions. 
Perhaps most similar to our own research is the work of Charles and Luoh (2006), who 
show that the shortage of black men in the New Mexico marriage market (because of 
high rates of incarceration) has induced more black women to get themselves a job or go 
to college so as to improve their marriage prospects. 
Although the Charles and Luoh piece investigates an opposite gender imbalance 
to the Indian context, it similarly invokes the notion of a competitive savings/investment 
effect of gender imbalances.  In the developing world Wei and Zhang (2009) test the 
competitive savings/investment model in the Chinese context where the interaction of 
strong male preferences and the one child policy has produced some of the sharpest 
gender imbalances in the world. Specifically, they argue that families with sons increase 
their savings rates in the face of competition in the marriage market caused by sex ratio 
imbalance.  Using data at the household, county and provincial level, as well as an 
instrumentation strategy that relies on provincial variations in the so called “one child 
policy”, they find that local sex imbalances are strongly associated with higher savings 
and entrepreneurial activity in households with sons.   6 
 
Our research question is whether this type of competitive saving behavior can be 
observed in India, given that gender imbalances have also been increasing in India (see 
Bhaskar (2010) for a theoretical treatment in the Indian context). In India these 
imbalances arise from the combination of a generally patrilineal inheritance system, the 
dowry convention, and the spread of sex selection technologies such as amniocentesis 
and ultrasound (UNFPA, 2007; Arnold et al., 2002; Clark, 2000; Dyson and Moore, 1983; 
Das Gupta, 1987; The Economist, 2010).  In one of the states with the highest gender 
imbalance, Punjab, there is even a saying that “raising a daughter is like watering your 
neighbor’s garden”.  As a result of these factors the ratio of marrying age women to 
marrying age men reaches as high 1.2 in states such as Punjab and Haryana, and is 
moderately high in states like Gujarat.  
Are these imbalances likely to induce competitive savings or investment? 
Certainly there is indirect evidence suggests that this could be the case. For example, 
Kaur (2004) reports that men of marriageable age are having difficulties in finding brides, 
while The Economist (2010) reports an incredible case of a Hindu from gender-
imbalanced Haryana importing a Muslim bride from Assam. The same article reports that 
the Red Cross Society of India estimates that at least 100 brides have been brought into 
Bhiwani, one of Haryana’s 21 districts. These examples suggests that India-specific 
social norms related to inheritance systems, dowry practice, and the complications of 
caste, language and religion, may not fully impede the effects of shifting conditions in the 
marriage market. Indeed, historical evidence shows that the dowry system is not set in 
stone and that Indian marriage norms have fluctuated between dowries (or negative bride 7 
 
prices) and (positive) bride prices, and that dowry prices have changed over time in 
response to demographic shifts (Rao, 1993). And although Indian marriages for most of 
the 20
th century have been secured through net dowry payments, many Indian marriages 
involve a two way transfer of resources; that is, from the groom’s side to the brides, and 
vice versa. Other evidence also shows that net bride prices are negative (i.e. dowries), 
Indian men of marrying age still compete with each other, with a range of research 
showing that the most important quality of a groom it is the ability to earn a living 
(Anderson, 2007).
1  
These various pieces of evidence and the economic theory underlying them lead 
us to believe that gender imbalances could indeed be inducing greater competition among 
marrying age men and their families, which may result in higher savings rate among boy-
dominated households in India. Our approach broadly tries to follow that of Wei and 
Zhang (2009), although we acknowledge up front that Indian data is empirically much 
more challenging (Section 2). Moreover, our study focuses on rural areas partly because 
of the suitability of the widely used Rural Economic and Demographic Surveys (REDS) 
(see Munshi and Rosenzweig (2009) for another paper that uses REDS to study the 
marriage market), and partly because rural areas are more likely to have more spatially 
segmented marriage markets, making the impact of district level gender imbalances more 
significant. And although we thus far lack the neat instrumentation of Wei and Zhang 
(2009) – which relies on variations in China’s one child policy – in Section 3 we presents 
                                                           
1 One piece of evidence that might contradict our theory would be dowry inflation. However 
, Edlund (2000) and Arunachalam and Logan (2008) argue that there is no evidence of dowry inflation in 
India. In future we hope to uncover evidence that net dowry prices are in fact going down in India. 8 
 
tests that specifically examine interactions between district level gender imbalances and 
boy-dominated households. Section 4 concludes by summarizing our findings, and 
identifying areas for future research. 
 
2.  Data  
To examine the variation of saving rates across households in regions with different 
degrees of gender imbalance, we use 1999 household level data from the Rural Economic 
and Demographic Surveys (REDS) collected by the National Council of Applied 
Economic Research (NCAER) and 1991 district level population data from the Indian 
census (Indian District Database developed by Vanneman and Barnes, 2000).  The REDS 
was started in 1968 and the 1999 round provides nationally representative data on 7,474 
rural Indian households residing in 253 villages in 16 major states and 100 districts.  
Following Dyson and Moore (1983), we group the states into three regions: the north, the 
south, and the east.
2  Besides household member characteristics and information on 
access to banks at the village level, the survey provides details on farm (crop production, 
livestock and allied activities, and agricultural wages) and non-farm (self-employment, 
salary/wage employment, and others) income sources, investments in physical and 
financial assets, allowing us to measure savings of the households.     
                                                           
2 North: Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh; 
South: Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu; East: Assam, Bihar, Orissa, 
West Bengal 9 
 
Mainly following Vashishtha (1989) and Paxson (1992), we define savings as the 
sum of investments in physical assets and net financial assets during the survey period.  
Physical assets include land, irrigation equipment, machinery, livestock, other allied 
agricultural activity assets, business assets, house property, and inventory accumulation.  
Financial assets include deposits with commercial banks, shares and securities, gold and 
jewelry, chit fund, cash holdings, small savings instruments, insurance, and provident 
funds.  From the census data we are able to calculate district-wise rural sex ratios of the 
age cohort 0-14 in 1991, which we then use to infer the sex ratios for the age cohort 8-22 
in 1999 as the two groups should theoretically be the same. Although a broad group, we 
consider this to be an age-group in which children are of marrying age, or in which 
parents are at least considering pre-marital savings decisions.  Finally, we match the 
census-based district level sex ratios in 1991 to household level data in 1999, yielding a 
sample of 5,531 households in 13 states and 74 districts.   
Summary statistics for the full sample and the subsamples of four-person 
households of various compositions and head ages are presented in table 2.  These 
subsamples are constructed by limiting the head ages to 40, 45, and 50 with two sons, 
two daughters or one son and one daughter who are unmarried and are younger than 20.  
This is to exclude households with both older and younger children, which would 
potentially contaminate the results for pre-marital savings.  We are left with 396, 504, 
and 556 observations respectively in the subsamples.  Because of the considerable noise 
with savings, we report median savings rates.  In the full sample, household heads are on 
average 49 years old with primary education.  Almost half (48%) of the sample have a 10 
 
young child aged 14 years or less and over 60% of the households have at least one 
unmarried son.  Regarding religion and caste, more than 90% of households are Hindu 
and about 20% belong to scheduled castes and tribes.  More than half the households 
reside in the north and about one-third of households have access to banks locally.  On 
the district level, close to 60% of the population are of working age (15-64).  Across the 
districts, median sex ratio of the age cohort 8-22 is approximately 1.06.  Median savings 
rate across all households is 9.2%. Consistent with the full sample, the four-person 
household subsamples all exhibit the same trend that savings rate is higher among 
households in districts with stronger gender imbalance.  As will be shown in the section 
below, this result is mainly driven by households with sons.  The heads are slightly more 
educated than the full sample and received on average 6 years of education.   
 
3.  Statistical Evidence 
Since the 1980s, both the sex ratio for marrying-age cohort and the savings rate of India 
have been increasing and tracking each other very closely.  This is evident in figure 1 
where we plot the sex ratio of age cohort 14-20 against national savings rate.  Correlation 
between these two series is as high as 0.92.   
To empirically test the hypothesis that households with sons display higher 
savings rate when faced with competition in marriage market due to intensifying local 
sex ratio, we estimate median regressions for household savings rate for the full sample 
and the four-person households with heads younger than 40, 45, and 50 respectively.    11 
 
With the full sample, we interact the number of unmarried sons aged 20 and younger with 
local sex ratio of the age cohort 8-22.  With the four-person household subsample, ideally 
we could examine the impact separately for each subgroup. Given the constraint of 
insufficient sample sizes of households with only two sons, two daughters, or one son and 
one daughter, we pool these households, create dummies for two-son and one-son-one-
daughter households and interact them with local sex ratio to examine the hypothesized 
relationship. 
As controls, we include education of head, age of head, household income, age 
category dummy of child, caste dummy, religion dummy, shares of young (15 and below) 
and old (60 and above) population, regional dummy, and household’s access to a bank in 
village dummy in the regressions.  In addition, we control for household size in the full 
sample regression.  
Table 3 presents the regression results of the full sample.  In column 4 we control 
for regional effects and access to banks, we find that although the coefficient on number 
of unmarried young sons is negative and significant, its interaction with local sex ratio is 
positive and significant.  Moreover, the magnitude of the interaction term barely changes 
across various specifications.  This result suggests that having a son per se would not 
raise savings rate, savings rate will increase only when households with sons face rising 
local marriage market pressure from gender imbalance.   
Savings rate also increases with household income, which supports the prediction 
of the precautionary saving theory.  A 1 percent increase in income is associated with an 12 
 
increase in savings rate of approximately 0.2 percentage point.  Surprisingly, education of 
head is negatively related to savings rate.  This could be attributed to the strong 
correlation between head’s education and household income.  Compared to the omitted 
category of 15-20, households with households with child aged 10-14 save less as they 
may incur higher education expenditures.  Consistent with Modigliani’s life-cycle theory 
(1970), a high dependency ratio has a negative impact on household savings rates.  This 
is evident in the negative and significant coefficients on the local shares of young and old 
populations.  The coefficient on household size is negative and significant.  While caste 
and religion are not significant, there exist regional differences in savings.  Households in 
the north exhibit stronger propensity to save (see column 2 of table 3).  However, the 
significance goes away when we add access to banks in the regression.  Access to banks, 
an indicator for local financial development, is negatively associated with savings rate.  
Improved access to credit may somewhat discourage savings to finance consumption. 
Turning to the four-person households, results obtained in the full sample hold in 
general.  Our primary interest lies in the interaction terms between the son dummies and 
local sex ratio.  As a check of robustness, we repeat the regression exercise on 
households with heads subject to various age limits.  Our main result is with head age 
limit set as 45 (average age of head of four-person household is 43 in the data) and is 
presented in table 4a.  In the full specification, the interaction terms are positive and 
significant.  Using households with two daughters as a control group, with a one 
percentage point increase in sex ratio, households with two sons and those with one son 
and one daughter raise their savings rate by approximately one percentage point (see 13 
 
column 4 of table 4a).  Household income remains significant at 1 percent level.  A 1 
percent increase in income raises savings rate by roughly 0.3 percentage point.  Again, 
age structure of local population affects savings rates of households.  In the full 
specification, increases in shares of young and old populations by 1 percentage point 
reduce savings rates by 1.2 and 4.6 percentage points respectively.  These results are also 
significant at 1 percent level.  In contrast to the full sample, households that belong to 
scheduled caste save more.  Coefficient on the north dummy is positive and significant.  
However, one should use caution when interpreting this coefficient as it captures some 
income and sex ratio effects.  Households in the north are richer than the rest in other 
regions.  They also experience a worse sex ratio than other regions.  If all else equal, 
households in the north tend to save more.  Similar to the full sample, the coefficients on 
bank and head education are negative.   
Robustness of results is established with varying the age limits of household 
heads (see table 4b).  It comes to our attention that the interaction term of two sons with 
sex ratio is no longer significant in the sample when the upper bound of head age is set to 
be 40.  The two-son dummy is also insignificant.  We interpret this as a sample size issue 
as lowering the age limit significantly reduces the number of observations by more than 
20 percent.   
 
4.  Conclusion 14 
 
With the availability of ultrasound sex identification technology and the presence of son-
preference culture, sex ratios in several Indian states have become increasingly skewed. 
Based on household survey data, we empirically show that the phenomenon of “missing 
women” appears to have resulted in a significant increase in household saving rates. This 
evidence is consistent with a marriage market squeeze, which in turn forces households 
with boys have to save more in order to improve the likelihood of their sons’ marriage.  
Of course, we do not consider this preliminary evidence definitive. Future 
research could usefully examine alternative forms of evidence, such as trends in net 
dowry prices, investments in human capital, evidence on migration for marriage, or 
analogous evidence for urban areas. We also cannot yet say how important a role the 
marriage market squeeze plays in aggregate savings trends for India, given that gender 
imbalances are mostly clustered in several north-western states, and given that many 
other factors could be driving up household savings in India (Section 1). Nevertheless, 
we believe that our preliminary evidence certainly warrants further investigation of 
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Figure 1: Sex Ratio and Savings Rate 
 
 
Note:  The sex ratio variable is defined as the child (0-6) sex ratio lagged by 14 years, 
which is available from the online database Indiastat (Indiastat.com).  The savings rate is 
defined as the percentage of (Gross national income - Total consumption + Net transfers) 





































































































Table 1: National Savings and Sex Ratio 
Variables  1975  1985  1995  2005 
Savings rate (% of GDP)  18  21.5  26.7  34.3 
Sex ratio for age cohort 14-20 
(male:female)  1.025  1.037  1.04  1.058 





Notes:  Gross national savings rate is defined as the percentage of (Gross national income 
- Total consumption + Net transfers) in total GDP, which is available from WDI 2009.  
The sex ratios for age cohort 14-20 are inferred from child (0-6) sex ratio.  For example, 
the cohort 14-20 in 2005 was the cohort 0-6 in the 1991 census, since the two groups 
should theoretically be the same.  Sex ratio data are available from Indiastat. 
a/ Sex ratio at birth (1985-1987) 
b/ Sex ratio at birth (1993-1995) 
c/ Sex ratio at birth (2004-2006) 20 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics on household and district characteristics and savings rates 
   All 
households      4-person households of head age ≤ 40     4-person households of head age  ≤ 45     4-person households of head age  ≤ 50 
   All     All     2 
sons     2 
daughters     son and 
daughter     All     2 
sons     2 
daughters     son and 
daughter     All     2 
sons     2 
daughters     son and 
daughter 
Median Savings 
rate (as % of 
income at1999 
prices) 
9.17    6.68    7.66    3.81    6.08    7.59    8.07    6.27    7.35    7.69    8.24    8.05    6.75 
                                                    Basic 




4.77    6.32    6.35    6.36    6.29    6.49    6.54    6.53    6.43    6.64    6.8    6.73    6.49 
Age of household 
head (years)  49.45    33.86    33.71    32.58    34.3    35.8    35.91    34.45    36.24    37.04    37.23    35.62    37.24 
Household income 
(log)  10.44    10.23    10.25    10.24    10.2    10.3    10.35    10.29    10.26    10.33    10.41    10.32    10.28 
Child aged 0-4   0.18    0.43    0.39    0.6    0.41    0.36    0.33    0.55    0.34    0.33    0.3    0.5    0.32 
Child aged 5-9  0.28    0.6    0.6    0.76    0.57    0.55    0.53    0.7    0.52    0.51    0.49    0.64    0.49 
Child aged 10-14   0.32    0.4    0.39    0.26    0.44    0.45    0.47    0.35    0.46    0.46    0.46    0.38    0.48 
Religion                                                       Hindu   0.91    0.93    0.95    0.98    0.9    0.92    0.94    0.97    0.9    0.93    0.94    0.97    0.91 
   Muslim   0.06    0.06    0.03    0.02    0.09    0.06    0.04    0.03    0.08    0.05    0.04    0.03    0.07 
Caste                                                       Scheduled caste   0.12    0.11    0.16    0.1    0.09    0.12    0.15    0.08    0.1    0.11    0.15    0.08    0.09 
   Scheduled tribe   0.08    0.06    0.05    0.02    0.08    0.07    0.05    0.03    0.08    0.06    0.05    0.05    0.08 
Region                                                       North   0.54    0.44    0.51    0.38    0.4    0.42    0.49    0.35    0.38    0.41    0.47    0.33    0.38 
   South   0.32    0.43    0.36    0.5    0.46    0.44    0.37    0.55    0.47    0.45    0.38    0.58    0.47 
Bank in village   0.33    0.35    0.33    0.34    0.38    0.37    0.35    0.37    0.38    0.37    0.35    0.36    0.38 
                                                    Community 
characteristics                                                   
District sex ratio   1.07    1.07    1.07    1.07    1.07    1.07    1.07    1.07    1.07    1.07    1.07    1.07    1.07 
District share of 
population aged ≤ 
15 
0.38    0.38    0.38    0.37    0.38    0.38    0.37    0.37    0.37    0.38    0.37    0.37    0.37 
District share of 
population aged ≥ 
60 
0.07    0.07    0.07    0.07    0.07    0.07    0.07    0.07    0.07    0.07    0.07    0.07    0.07 
                                                    Number of 
observations  5531     396     147     50     199     504     192     60     252     556     215     66     275 21 
 
Table 3: Median Regressions for Household Savings Rate in Rural India for the Full 
Sample in 1999 
    
  1  2  3  4 
Sex ratio  0.31***  0.22***  0.28***  0.23*** 
  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08) 
Number of unmarried sons  -9.63*  -10.72**  -9.60**  -10.33** 
  (5.13)  (4.71)  (4.62)  (4.62) 
Number of unmarried sons x Sex ratio  0.08*  0.09**  0.08*  0.09** 
  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Education of household head  -0.35***  -0.38***  -0.37***  -0.37*** 
  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.07) 
Age of household head  -0.03  -0.02  -0.03  -0.03 
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Household income (log)  22.83***  22.95***  23.09***  23.01*** 
  (0.43)  (0.40)  (0.39)  (0.39) 
Child aged 0-4  0.84  0.72  0.14  0.37 
  (0.92)  (0.84)  (0.82)  (0.83) 
Child aged 5-9  0.44  0.55  0.66  0.48 
  (0.84)  (0.78)  (0.76)  (0.76) 
Child aged 10-14  -1.31*  -1.61**  -1.66**  -1.49** 
  (0.79)  (0.72)  (0.71)  (0.71) 
Scheduled caste  0.28  0.58  0.53  0.9 
  (0.95)  (0.87)  (0.86)  (0.85) 
Scheduled tribe  1.67  0.95  1.32  1.49 
  (1.20)  (1.10)  (1.08)  (1.08) 
Muslim  -0.01  0.44  0.41  0.53 
  (1.26)  (1.18)  (1.14)  (1.16) 
Share of population in district younger than 15  -0.41***  -0.64***  -0.51***  -0.75*** 
  (0.11)  (0.13)  (0.10)  (0.13) 
Share of population in district older than 60  -1.42***  -1.64***  -1.61***  -1.86*** 
  (0.38)  (0.39)  (0.34)  (0.39) 
Household size  -2.08***  -2.10***  -2.13***  -2.14*** 
  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10) 
North     2.03*    1.41 
    (1.08)    (1.06) 
South    -1.18    -2.11* 
    (1.25)    (1.24) 
Bank      -3.77***  -3.66*** 
      (0.60)  (0.60) 
Constant  -218.83***  -200.83***  -211.14***  -194.36*** 
  (10.03)  (10.54)  (9.05)  (10.33) 
          Pseudo R
2  0.1727  0.1736  0.1753  0.1762 
Observations  5473  5473  5473  5473 
          *** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 1% level22 
 
Table 4a: Median Regressions for Household Savings Rates in Four-Person 
Households with Head Age ≤ 45 
    
  1  2  3  4 
Education of household head  -0.55**  -0.61**  -0.43*  -0.50** 
  (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.23)  (0.24) 
Age of household head  -0.04  0.17  0.15  0.22 
  (0.22)  (0.21)  (0.19)  (0.21) 
Household income (log)  30.40***  30.16***  29.71***  30.05*** 
  (1.64)  (1.59)  (1.47)  (1.56) 
Child aged 0-4  -0.27  1.55  3.23  3.09 
  (2.84)  (2.73)  (2.51)  (2.68) 
Child aged 5-9  2.76  2.79  2.99  3.01 
  (2.19)  (2.15)  (1.95)  (2.09) 
Child aged 10-14  -5.58**  -4.24*  -2.69  -3.43 
  (2.64)  (2.55)  (2.36)  (2.48) 
Scheduled caste  7.84**  7.64**  5.83**  7.41** 
  (3.26)  (3.24)  (2.96)  (3.10) 
Scheduled tribe  2.68  2.86  5.89  4.25 
  (4.24)  (4.09)  (3.80)  (4.10) 
Muslim  -0.73  0.62  0.66  0.92 
  (4.66)  (4.64)  (4.03)  (4.47) 
Share of population in district younger 
than 15  -0.81**  -0.69  -0.90***  -1.17*** 
  (0.37)  (0.45)  (0.34)  (0.45) 
Share of population in district older 
than 60  -3.48***  -4.63***  -3.66***  -4.59*** 
  (1.27)  (1.36)  (1.13)  (1.32) 
Sex ratio  -0.78  -1.12**  -0.79  -0.91* 
  (0.56)  (0.55)  (0.50)  (0.54) 
Two sons  -151.57**  -118.74*  -128.00**  -118.14* 
  (68.65)  (66.77)  (60.58)  (64.54) 
One son and one daughter  -123.87*  -94.5  -137.39**  -137.34** 
  (66.22)  (64.30)  (58.97)  (62.48) 
Two sons x Sex ratio  1.42**  1.11*  1.22**  1.13* 
  (0.65)  (0.63)  (0.57)  (0.61) 
(One son and one daughter) x Sex ratio  1.20*  0.91  1.32**  1.32** 
  (0.63)  (0.61)  (0.56)  (0.59) 
North    10.24**    6.85* 
    (4.14)    (4.07) 
South     6.43    3.29 
    (4.48)    (4.41) 
Bank      -8.81***  -6.78*** 
      (1.98)  (2.14) 
Constant  -162.73***  -134.96**  -156.70***  -137.92** 
  (60.73)  (61.37)  (54.15)  (59.80) 
          Pseudo R
2  0.2073  0.2111  0.2176  0.2202 
Observations  504  504  504  504 
            *** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 1% level23 
 
Table 4b: Median Regressions for Household Savings Rates in Four-Person 
Households with Different Cutoff Age of Household Head 
   
  1  2  3  4 
Age of household head <= 40         
          Sex ratio  -0.84*  -1.04*  -0.51  -0.75 
  (0.46)  (0.55)  (0.43)  (0.57) 
Two sons  -65.33  -76.72  -68.84  -52.53 
  (59.23)  (68.54)  (55.19)  (70.69) 
One son and one daughter  -108.32*  -126.64*  -119.05**  -126.34* 
  (55.33)  (64.92)  (51.31)  (66.26) 
Two sons x Sex ratio  0.65  0.74  0.70  0.53 
  (0.56)  (0.64)  (0.52)  (0.66) 
(One son and one daughter) x Sex ratio  1.06**  1.23**  1.17**  1.22* 
  (0.52)  (0.61)  (0.48)  (0.62) 
          Pseudo R
2  0.2088  0.2101  0.2174  0.2189 
Observations  396  396  396  396 
  1  2  3  4 
Age of household head <= 50   
       
Sex ratio  -1.12  -1.22*  -0.95  -1.21* 
  (0.76)  (0.65)  (0.68)  (0.65) 
Two sons  -178.67*  -120.54  -138.90*  -144.46* 
  (91.93)  (77.40)  (82.75)  (78.01) 
One son and one daughter  -160.05*  -147.67*  -167.06**  -153.00** 
  (89.91)  (75.31)  (80.41)  (75.66) 
Two sons x Sex ratio  1.66*  1.12  1.32*  1.36* 
  (0.87)  (0.73)  (0.78)  (0.74) 
(One son and one daughter) x Sex ratio  1.51*    1.40**    1.59**    1.45** 
         (0.85)   (0.71)        (0.76)    (0.72) 
          Pseudo R
2  0.2015  0.2049  0.211  0.2137 
Observations  556  556  556  556 
          *** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 1% level 
Note: All specifications include the same control variables as in the regression on the subsample 
of age of household head ≤ 45, but their estimated coefficients are not reported here. 